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Mental Chemistry:1 Combination for 
Panpsychists 
ABSTRACT 
Panpsychism, an increasingly popular competitor to physicalism as a theory of mind, faces a 
famous difficulty, the ‘combination problem’. This is the difficulty of understanding the 
composition of a conscious mind by parts (the ultimates) which are themselves taken to be 
phenomenally qualitied. I examine the combination problem, and I attempt to solve it. There 
are a few distinct difficulties under the banner of ‘the combination problem’, and not all of 
them need worry panpsychists. After homing in on the genuine worries, I identify some 
disputable assumptions that underlie them. Doing away with these assumptions allows us to 
make a start on a working conception of phenomenal combination.  
 
0. Introduction 
Panpsychists need to say something about the combination problem. According to 
panpsychists, it is unintelligible that utterly non-phenomenal material parts could be put 
together so that their mere assembly yields a conscious mind. For how could the conscious, 
the felt, the sentient, derive from the dead, the unfeeling, the insentient? That is why we have 
an explanatory gap and why, so say the panpsychists, conventional physicalism should be 
abandoned in favour of a view that sees the ultimates possessed of phenomenal qualities.2  
With phenomenal properties there in ontology from the outset, panpsychists aver, we will 
have removed the major hurdle in the way of understanding how the arrangement of matter 
can be the arranging of a mind. But physicalists are quick with a tu quoque3 retort. We can no 
more understand how phenomenal bits and pieces could form the large phenomenal unities 
we recognise as minds than we can grasp how purely physical parts could compose a 
conscious mind, the physicalists say.4 Thus the debate between physicalists and panpsychists 
sits at something of a deadlock, with explanatory gaps alleged on both sides. Perhaps 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I understand the term ‘mental chemistry’ is due to Mill. 
2 ‘Ultimates’ is a placeholder for the basic constituents of matter, wave/particles, strings, fields or whatever. I 
derive the term from Galen Strawson. The panpsychist’s ultimates are to be conceived of as follows: objects 
whose essential intrinsic nature is phenomenal. So one such ultimate may be conceived of as an object with a 
unitary phenomenal quality (for example phenomenal blue). On this conception the panpsychist’s ultimates are 
simples, which chimes with the empirical assumptions of modern physics. See also note 29. 
3	  I follow Shani in labelling the physicalist response the ‘tu quoque argument’. See Shani 2010. 
4 As Goff puts the point: ‘[t]he emergence of novel macroexperiential properties from the coming together of 
microexperiential properties is as brute and miraculous as the emergence of macroexperiential properties from 
non-experiential properties.’ (2006, 54) I take it that it is implicit here that what are coming together are things 
(i.e. ultimates) with microexperiential properties—it’s hard to know what else could be meant by talk of 
properties coming together. It is the alleged unintelligibility of phenomenal combination that also underwrites 
Goff’s (2009b) ‘panpsychist zombie’ argument’ (see final section).  
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panpsychists would insist that their explanatory gap—the question of how phenomenally-
qualitied items combine, in effect—is conceptually less daunting than the physicalist one of 
conjuring phenomenality out of non-phenomenality: for the latter gap uniquely concerns the 
production of phenomenal quality as such.5 But still, the dialectical damage is done: If the 
appeal of panpsychism is its promise to fill an explanatory lacuna, to make perspicuous the 
generation of mind, then the existence of a gap in our understanding concerning the manner 
in which micro-phenomenal components combine into phenomenal unities is fatal to 
panpsychism. It thereby loses its edge. So panpsychists must say something about the 
combination problem.  
 
In what follows, I examine the combination problem, and I attempt to solve it. There 
are a few distinct difficulties under the banner ‘the combination problem’, and not all of them 
need worry panpsychists. After homing in on the genuine worries, I identify some disputable 
assumptions that underlie them. Doing away with these assumptions allows us to make a start 
on a working conception of phenomenal combination. In the final section I tackle a powerful 
argument against panpsychism recently given by Goff (Goff, 2009b). This ‘panpsychic 
zombie argument’ is built upon Goff’s understanding of the combination problem, so our 
treatment of the problem proves key to answering Goff’s concerns.  
 
1. Combination Problems 
This ‘panpsychist explanatory gap’ is not news to panpsychists—it was first noted by one of 
their own, William James. Another William, Seager, devised the moniker ‘the combination 
problem’ (Seager, 1995). In the hands of James and Seager the difficulty is even more serious 
than as described above. According to James, the problem is not just that we lack an 
understanding of how phenomenal parts can form a phenomenal whole—that we are missing 
the instruction manual, if you like—the real difficulty is that such combination is impossible 
in principle: for the very notion of phenomenal composition is metaphysically incoherent.6 
Perhaps the most well-known passage from James in this connection is the following  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See e.g. Hartshorne 1977 for this panpsychist claim. 
6 I am using the verbs ‘combine’ and ‘compose’ more or less equivalently. This is because the combination 
problem is at root a question of how phenomenal composition, after material composition, can occur. I take it 
that if and only if phenomenal parts can combine, then they can compose a phenomenal whole. 
3	  
	  
Take a hundred [feelings], shuffle them and pack them as close together as you can 
(whatever that may mean) still each remains the same feeling it always was, shut in its 
own skin, windowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean… (James 
1890/1950, 160) 
 
Feelings, or, as I will say, phenomenal elements,7 simply do not combine, James says. But 
why does he think this? There is intuitive force to James’s playing card metaphor, but what is 
missing from the passage is any detailed rationale underlying that force. I think Shani has 
done an excellent job of bringing out what seems to have been the reasoning underlying 
James’s rejection of phenomenal combination (Shani, 2010). Shani calls our attention to 
excerpts such as this one, too often ignored by physicalist proponents of the combination 
problem:  
 
Atoms of feeling cannot compose higher feelings, any more than atoms of matter can 
compose physical things! The ‘things,’ for a clear-headed atomistic evolutionist, are 
not. Nothing is but the everlasting atoms. When grouped in a certain way, we name 
them this ‘thing’ or that; but the thing we name has no existence out of our mind.  
(Ibid., 161) 
 
In this surprising passage James effectively says that phenomenal combination is impossible 
just because combination in general is impossible. As Shani reveals, James held an 
aggregative conception of parts and wholes: wholes, on this view, are nothing but aggregates 
of their parts. The key features of aggregates are that each member in an aggregate remains 
essentially separate from and intrinsically unaffected by the other members of the aggregate. 
This lack of internal connectedness means that a whole never forms; something that reacts to 
the external world in an integrated way. Consider a pile of bricks. The mass of the pile 
derives in a linear manner from the sum of the masses of the individual bricks. No brick is 
intrinsically altered by its membership of the aggregate; each (as James says of phenomenal 
elements) ‘remains, in the sum, what it always was’ (James 1890/1950, 158). If this is 
exclusively how parts and wholes relate, then panpsychists are indeed going to face a 
combination problem: the ‘bricks’ in a phenomenal construction are bound not to combine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 My term is more general, since colour qualia are also phenomenal elements, for example, but are not in any 
clear sense ‘feelings’. Feelings are only one sort of phenomenal item, and the combination problem occurs for 
items of any phenomenal kind, so long as they are phenomenally propertied. On my usage, the phenomenally-
qualitied ultimates posited by panpsychists also count as phenomenal elements. I will mostly talk in terms of the 
ultimates, just because my interlocutors talk in those terms and it makes discussion easier. 
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phenomenally-speaking, which is to say that we will always have a mere collection of 
isolated phenomenal elements and never an integrated phenomenal whole.  
However, James appears pretty clearly mistaken about composition in general, at least 
as far as modern science is concerned. Examples positively abound of composite systems 
whose organisation and property determination is not of the merely aggregative variety. 
Practically any example of molecular constitution from chemistry will suffice to illustrate this. 
When two hydrogen atoms bond with an oxygen atom to make water, the parts are 
intrinsically altered by their association: the covalent bond between the hydrogens and the 
oxygen means that the oxygen atom takes up an electron from each hydrogen atom in order to 
complete its outer shell. Due to this sharing, the oxygen’s natural configuration is altered; and 
the covalently bonded mode of existence of each atom is in an obvious way one of 
dependence on the other atom(s) with which it is bonded. Moreover the composite, the water 
molecule, clearly has properties and powers that are novel, although intelligibly derived from 
those of its constituents (for instance it forms a dipole). Here is a more mundane example. 
When you cook a lasagne, you mix together ground beef, tomatoes, onion, garlic, a bay leaf 
and red wine to make the ragu (at least, that’s the recipe I follow). But a ragu isn’t a mere 
aggregate of these ingredients: in that case you’re not doing your cooking properly. The red 
wine infuses the tomatoes, changing the character and flavour of both. The sauce leaks into 
the ground beef, that’s why the ragu tastes better when left in the fridge a day or two. The 
onions become garlicky. The tomato sauce becomes oniony. You get the idea. And, 
importantly, a culinary unity is thereby formed: a lasagne has properties, of taste, texture and 
so on, all of its own, which are distinct from, though the logical upshot of, the meeting and 
melding of its parts. The key features of these examples, as against the merely aggregative 
conception of wholes, are that the parts which come together intrinsically alter one another, 
and, by entering into a structure whereby they so condition one another, they form a unity: 
something which relates to the outside as an integrated whole. This last feature shows up in 
the production of novel, system-wide powers. In short, if James’s objection to phenomenal 
combination is just that combination doesn’t happen in general, then James’s objection 
doesn’t seem a very good one.  
If there exists a genuine combination problem for panpsychists, it follows, it must 
have something to do with phenomenal combination in particular. We know that combination 
happens, all across the natural world. So if there’s something distinctively problematic about 
the combination of phenomenal elements, it must derive from the fact of their phenomenality.  
5	  
	  
In fact I think we can discern two combination problems that spring from the notion that 
there’s something particularly bothersome about the combination of phenomenal parts into 
wholes. The first of these I’ll label the ‘Block/Stoljar problem’, and the second is the ‘Goff 
problem’, after the philosophers who formulated them. This pair of difficulties, I will argue, 
constitutes the real combination problem for panpsychists. 
Block, cited by Stoljar, tells one of those helpful philosophical fables starring conveniently 
contrived aliens:  
 
For reasons known only to them, [tiny aliens] decide to devote the next few hundred 
years to creating out of their matter substances with the chemical and physical 
characteristics (except at the subelementary particle level) of our elements. They build 
hordes of space ships of different varieties about the sizes of our electrons, protons and 
other elementary particles, and fly the ships in such a way as to mimic the behaviour 
of these elementary particles. The ships also contain generators to produce the type of 
radiation elementary particles give off. Each ship has a staff of experts on the nature of 
our elementary particles. They do this so as to produce huge (by our standards) masses 
of substances with the chemical and physical characteristics of oxygen, carbon etc. 
(Block 1980, 280, cited in Stoljar 2006, 120) 
 
As the story continues, we head off to colonise the area of space where the tiny aliens live. 
After spending some years there, growing and eating crops and breathing the air and so on, 
we ingest and come to be thoroughly constituted by the alien spaceships. In Stoljar’s hands 
Block’s example—originally devised with functionalism as target—apparently reveals the 
shortcomings of panpsychism. Here we have conscious beings, ourselves, constituted by 
phenomenally-propertied items, the conscious aliens. And yet not only does it not thereby 
become easier to understand how our conscious minds are constructed from material 
ingredients, but it rather appears obvious that the assembly of phenomenally-qualitied 
components will precisely not generate such a macro-mind. Putting conscious micro-aliens 
together does not seem to have anything to do with the consciousness of the being they 
compose. Moreover, the example makes clear, little minds assembled do not pool into a 
corporate mind. All in all this would appear an effective reductio of panpsychism.8  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 As it stands Block’s story is not quite a panpsychist fable, of course: for the conscious aliens live inside 
spaceships, which are the genuine constituents of our bodies and brains. Moreover it is the spaceships’ emission 
of radiation that gives them the properties of basic particles. Thus it is open to the panpsychist to reject the 
reductio, on the grounds that Block’s case is not one of our genuine composition by phenomenally-qualitied 
parts (thanks to a referee for this point). However, it is clear that Block’s story can be swiftly modified to evade 
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So understood, we can now make perfect sense of what James had in mind, or 
anyhow should have had in mind, when talking of shuffling ‘windowless’ phenomenal 
elements, and this procedure getting us no closer to a composite consciousness. The 
‘windowless’ locution likely derives from Leibniz, who expresses the idea thus: ‘There is no 
way of explaining how a monad can be altered or changed internally by some other 
creature…the monads have no windows through which something can enter or leave.’ 
(Leibniz 1714/1991, 68) If nothing can enter or leave a monad—a phenomenal ultimate, in 
our terms—if it cannot condition or be conditioned by its fellow phenomenal ultimates, and 
this is precisely on account of its phenomenal nature, then this indeed constitutes a genuine 
obstacle to phenomenal combination. We can therefore ignore James’s claim that only 
aggregation is possible in nature. If the windowless thesis is true then phenomenal ultimates 
will be restricted to mere blind aggregation, just as illustrated in Block’s thought experiment, 
and this will be on account of their phenomenality. Something about being a locus of 
phenomenality, it seems, entails being windowless; forever shut off from, and intrinsically 
unconditioned by, whichever other phenomenally-qualitied items one enters into relations 
with, presumably no matter how tight those relations. What is it about being phenomenal in 
nature that has this apparent implication? We will investigate this matter in the next section; 
for now we need only note the shape of the Block/Stoljar problem. 
Let us turn next to the Goff problem. Here is Goff: 
 
my having, through introspection, a transparent understanding of the essential nature 
of my conscious experience is sharply in tension...with my conscious experience 
turning out to be...quite different from how it appears...i.e. turning out to be 
constituted of the experiential being of billions of micro subjects of experience (Goff 
2006, 57)  
 
This objection appears as the panpsychist analogue of the familiar ‘grain problem’ for 
physicalists. The grain problem is the difficulty of understanding how the mind can be 
composite in nature when consciousness exhibits a striking phenomenal unity. The brain is 
composed of billions of neurons, and even at higher levels of description it possesses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
this difficulty, by removing the alien ships and letting the conscious aliens themselves be our constituents, and 
does not seem to lose force thereby. The reader should from here on take Block’s alien story in whichever of 
these ways seems strongest. This thought experiment, as we will see, is closely related to Goff’s panpsychic 
zombie argument (see final section).  
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dizzyingly various cognitive systems and sub-systems, no few of which appear to have direct 
input into the state of consciousness. But then, the objection to physicalism goes, how can 
any system composed of units in this way be identical to—or even realise—a field of 
consciousness of the sort we are familiar with in our own case? For it is a salient and 
impressive aspect of one’s conscious field at a given time—one’s (non-instantaneous, but 
quantized, it lasts a second or so) present experience of sensations of different sorts across 
different modalities, of thoughts, of pervading emotional tenor—that it is experienced as a 
unity, as something integrated and whole. Poring over the smooth surface of one’s 
consciousness, as it were, one does not find elements that correspond to the physical, or 
neurological, or even cognitive texture that physicalists surmise realises the phenomenal 
panoply. One’s investigative phenomenal fingers just do not come across the cracks or gaps 
or ‘bitty-ness’ one could expect to find were the conscious field composite in nature, as 
physical identity or realisation seem to require. 
If anything, the panpsychist’s version of this difficulty is even more pressing. As Goff 
suggests, it is taken to be a cardinal feature of phenomenal life that the subject of a particular 
phenomenal element, the pain you feel when you stub your toe for example, has a transparent 
sort of access to the nature of that element. We need not suppose that this transparent access 
amounts to the ‘revelation’9 of the whole essence of a given phenomenal element: the idea 
that when it comes to the phenomenal we are in the special position of knowing what the item 
in question is in its entirety, that there can be nothing more to a given phenomenal element 
than what is manifest in the experiencing of it by the subject. The notion of revelation 
immediately provokes problems for any claim that the phenomenal has a physical nature, 
since this physicality is very arguably not manifest in conscious experience. We do not need 
to get involved with such a heavyweight and controversial epistemological thesis here. 
Instead, to create a problem for panpsychism we need only to construe the transparent access 
in question as follows. We need only suppose that one has, in the introspection of a given 
phenomenal element of which one is the subject, a direct and complete access to how that 
element feels, its phenomenal quality. This modest thesis concerning phenomenal availability 
takes no stand on whether the phenomenal has some essential nature not given in experience. 
All it says is that if you are undergoing a phenomenal episode, then introspection can reveal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The thesis is so named by Johnston (1992) who discusses it in relation to colour properties. 
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to you the complete facts about how that episode feels.10 Now for the difficulty: If it is 
manifest in this way to the subject of a given phenomenal element how that element is 
phenomenally-speaking, how it feels, then the presence of untold hordes of phenomenal 
elements together making up my consciousness at a time ought to be something I can be 
aware of. If there are billions of phenomenally-qualitied ultimates bustling away in the 
composite structure of my mind, it goes with their being phenomenally qualitied, and being 
units, that the different phenomenalities of each one ought to be accessible to introspection. 
Yet this is precisely what we do not find. As with the conventional grain problem, the fingers 
of thought just do not find those cracks and gaps, or those bits and pieces. One finds a smooth 
phenomenal whole, albeit featuring various tranches of quality of different kinds, 
corresponding to different thoughts, feelings, and sensations. But these tranches are distinct 
things more in the way that the sea can have different waves, than in the way that a Seurat 
painting is made up of different dots. Hence, Goff’s argument concludes, the mind is not 
composed of a multitude of phenomenal ultimates. To summarise: the fact of phenomenal 
combination, phenomenal multitude, couldn’t help but be manifest to consciousness. But no 
such feeling of multitude is manifest, or available in any way, to consciousness. So 
consciousness is not composite, there is no phenomenal combination.11 
We have unearthed our two combination problems. The first one, the Block/Stoljar 
problem, purports to show that phenomenal ultimates do not combine due to their 
phenomenal nature. The second one, the Goff problem, purports to show that phenomenal 
ultimates do not combine because their doing so would come with certain unavoidable 
evidence, evidence that we cannot find. There is some a priori reason for thinking that two is 
just the right number of problems to have found in the vicinity of phenomenal combination. 
For the Block/Stojar problem and the Goff problem, respectively, represent the metaphysical 
and epistemological aspects of the combination problem. The Block/Stoljar problem is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This is not to say that the phenomenal character of the episode will be revealed to you, you may not be 
concentrating on it; nor that you will correctly classify it in thought or speech if you choose to try. 
11 A referee objects that the panpsychist may deny that we have transparent access to the states of the ultimates 
that compose our consciousness. If we do not have such access, then the unity of consciousness apparent to 
introspection will not clash with the hypothesis that consciousnesses is composed of hordes of phenomenal 
ultimates, for there will be no reason to expect the phenomenal multiplicity to show up in introspection. But the 
transparency thesis as it concerns the states of the ultimates is highly plausible, not least because it is hard to 
understand what would be meant by saying that a set of phenomenally-qualitied ultimates composed one’s 
consciousness— composed it in respect of its phenomenality, and on account of their own—if the relationship 
between each ultimate’s phenomenal quality and the quality of the composite consciousness were not intimate. 
Thus, on the assumption that we have good introspective access to our own consciousness—an assumption that 
anti-physicalist views in general tend to rely heavily upon—it would follow that we ought to have access to the 
quality of the ultimates, if they do indeed phenomenally compose the larger consciousness. 
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problem concerning the difficulty of actually combining phenomenal ultimates given their 
metaphysical nature. The Goff problem for its part has to do with the likely epistemic upshot 
of such combination, and the fact of the absence of any such upshot. It makes sense that there 
should be these two aspects to the problem. So we may feel with some legitimacy that we 
have laid bare the essence of the combination problem, and, if we can treat these difficulties, 
we may hope to provide the panpsychist with a considerable fillip in the dispute with her 
physicalist opponent.  
 
2. Problematic Assumptions 
There is a pair of assumptions at work behind the combination problems. We must expose 
them and find a way to reject them if we are to progress towards making good on the promise 
of panpsychism. The assumptions are as follows: 
 
i. Phenomenal ultimates are themselves subjects of experience. 
ii. Phenomenal assembly can only be aggregative. 
As we will see, the First Assumption is what makes the Second Assumption plausible. For 
that reason, our main attention will be on disposing of the First Assumption. Before turning 
to that tricky conceptual task, however, let us observe the role the assumptions play in 
underwriting our two combination problems.  
It is easy to see the assumptions at work in the Block/Stoljar problem. In particular, it 
is the First Assumption which licenses the inference that given the phenomenal nature of 
panpsychic ultimates, their combination will be metaphysically impossible. What Block 
envisages in his fable are alien minds, which is to say essentially discrete subjects, put 
together towards the composition of a further mind. But our notion of a mind, like our notion 
of a subject, is precisely the notion of a discrete, essentially inviolable sphere of conscious-
experiential goings-on. My mind is separate from your mind, is separate from her mind, and 
so on. None of us has, nor can have, access to the consciousness of another, to what it is like 
for them. Thence, in part, comes the modern incarnation of the mind-body problem, as made 
vivid by Nagel (Nagel, 1974) and Jackson (Jackson, 1982) in particular. What we are terming 
a mind here, or a subject (for me these two terms will be equivalent), can be cashed out via 
the notion of a phenomenal perspective, as follows. Consider a cluster of experiences, 
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proprioceptive, emotional, cognitive-phenomenal 12  and perceptual, that are together 
associated in a single phenomenal perspective. What it means to say that these experiences 
together constitute this one phenomenal perspective, and not any other, can be captured by 
thinking about an act of introspection performed from within that phenomenal perspective. 
Such an act of introspection will disclose just the aforementioned experiences and no others, 
it will not disclose the set of experiences that belongs to any other conscious mind. Intuitively, 
phenomenal perspectives—minds, subjects—include at a time a discrete set of phenomenally 
conscious elements, to which an introspective act on the part of one such phenomenal 
perspective has access. These spheres of experience, each one bound up by the reach of its 
particular potential introspective access, are by their fundamental nature closed off from one 
another. For if there is a question over whether a certain experiential element is part of your 
mind or part of mine, the question is to be settled by which of our minds has (or could have) 
introspective access to that element. Whichever way the matter falls, we will have two 
distinct phenomenal perspectives here and not one. Even if it turns out that the experiential 
element is (somehow) introspectively accessible to both of us,13 we still have two discrete 
minds on our hands. For I do not have access to the set of phenomenal elements that 
comprises your phenomenal perspective, and you do not have access to the set of phenomenal 
elements that comprises mine. We merely share one element; much as if, whatever else we 
were thinking about and feeling, we were looking attentively at the same dog from more or 
less the same angle. To take the case to the limit, if it obtained that my introspective access 
necessarily ranged over just the same set of phenomenal elements as yours, then we would 
have no choice but to conclude that we really had only one mind (subject, phenomenal 
perspective) here, not two. To say that there are two entails that the introspective access of 
one could differ as to some phenomenal element, with respect to the other.14 As a conceptual 
exercise to confirm the foregoing, consider a case of telepathy. I implant into your mind 
certain memories or sensations that I have undergone, and at the same time I relive those 
memories or sensations. Even this does not overcome the basic boundaries around each of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I.e. the phenomenology of thought. It does feel some way to think about Princess Diana, or to understand 
what someone is saying to you. It may be that there is no particular way a given thought must feel, but that 
doesn’t mean the thought can feel no way at all when it is entertained. See Strawson 2008 for  more on cognitive 
phenomenology. 
13 Perhaps we are the different hemispheres in a split-brain patient: see Lockwood’s (1989) breathtaking 
discussion of split-brain cases, after Nagel 1979. This might be what happens, I imagine, in a Vulcan ‘mind-
meld’, as in Star Trek. I discuss telepathy just below. 
14 This is not to dispute Goff’s (2009b) observation that two distinct subjects could have exactly the same 
(qualitatively speaking) experiences at a given time. But what is not feasible is that two subjects exist without 
the logical possibility of their synchronous sets of experiences differing from one another. 
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our phenomenal perspectives. For there is, for you, a distinctive ‘what it is like’, a realm of 
conscious goings-on, which may include, for example, surprise at what I am transmitting to 
you, and which certainly includes what it is like for you to undergo experiences of this kind. 
Meanwhile, there is for me a quite distinct ‘what it is like’, which involves the sense that I 
have had these sensations before, or that they are my sensations. I may wonder how you feel 
in receiving them. Clearly, despite having some qualitative overlap, our phenomenal 
perspectives are irrevocably separate. Hence, minds (subjects, phenomenal perspectives) are 
inviolable individuals. This is in part what is involved in the fact that each subject represents 
a distinctive ‘point of view’ on the world. 
Now since minds (subjects) are fenced off from one another, they cannot combine. 
You cannot mix or pool minds to create a larger mind, no matter how closely you bind them 
together: not even when they are arranged into the structure of a brain.15 This is what Block’s 
thought experiment makes vivid. The only manner of grouping minds is aggregative—you 
can pile them up, but you cannot genuinely integrate them. So, as long as a being were 
composed of genuine minds, each of these minds would be bound to remain separate (‘in the 
sum, what it always was’).16 Thus we see how the First Assumption plays a key role in the 
Block/Stoljar problem, and how it supports the Second Assumption, leading straight to a 
combination problem. It is the First Assumption that generates the metaphysical problem of 
combination on the basis of the specifically phenomenal nature of phenomenal ultimates. The 
Block/Stoljar problem takes it that phenomenal ultimates are, ipso facto, minds; and from the 
essential closedness of minds it follows, as the Second Assumption has it, that phenomenal 
ultimates can only aggregate, not combine. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 To be precise, if telepathy is possible then it seems that some mind-to-mind conditioning is feasible, but not a 
sufficient amount to place minds into a genuine (mental) whole: the sort of intra-structural causation required 
there would have to be of a high enough level to integrate the components, i.e. to make them react as a 
corporation to external things, and to develop novel systemic properties. 
16 It is tempting to imagine that two minds might ‘fuse’ in such a way that they give birth to a third mind, and in 
the process cease to exist themselves (a referee suggests this idea). Is this a case of the combination of minds? It 
is not. In the combination of hydrogens and oxygen to form water, for example, what was clear was that the 
constituent atoms continued to exist, albeit in modified form, after the integrated whole was formed. For minds 
to combine into a further mind, therefore, they would have to continue to exist after the formation of the whole. 
But this possibility—their genuine survival plus their genuine combination—is ruled out by the metaphysics of 
phenomenal perspectives, as described. Either the minds would be annihilated (as the referee proposes) and this 
would be the spawning, but not the composition, of a new mind, or they would continue to exist and there would 
therefore exist two quite separate minds, as well as perhaps a third that they had caused to come into being. On 
neither possibility is genuine mental combination achieved Rather this picture seems closer to the emergence of 
a mind; but if we are emergentists we needn’t have pursued panpsychism in the first place.  
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Goff avoids the term ‘minds’ when posing his combination problem, but the notion of 
‘subjects’ he employs does the same work.17 The best way to see the two assumptions 
operating in Goff’s thinking is to quickly reverse-engineer his argument. Given the 
‘transparent access’ thesis, Goff’s central observation is that we do not experience an 
aggregate of phenomenal ultimates—a collection of separate loci of phenomenality. Since we 
do not experience such an aggregate, he reasons, our consciousness is not composed of a 
multitude of phenomenal ultimates. This inference reveals that Goff believes the only 
possible manner of assembling phenomenal ultimates to be aggregative. For if he allowed 
that there might be other ways of arranging a phenomenal multitude, he could not move from 
the phenomenological claim that we do not experience an aggregate to the conclusion that our 
consciousness is not composed of a phenomenal multitude. Thus we see that Goff endorses 
the Second Assumption. But why does he think that phenomenal ultimates could only be 
assembled aggregatively? The plausible answer is that he thinks this because he takes 
phenomenal ultimates to be subjects of experience, and it is a priori that subjects, like minds, 
are discrete, inviolable spheres of mentality. You can stack them, but you cannot pool them. 
So Goff, too, endorses the First Assumption: in fact it drives his argument. 
The two assumptions are the key to unlocking the combination problem. And the First 
Assumption is as we have seen especially important. Dialectical note: Block/Stoljar and Goff 
do not themselves suppose that ultimates are minds/subjects, of course, because they oppose 
panpsychism. So the way the assumptions function is that our critics take the panpsychist to 
be committed to the First Assumption, then the critics infer the Second Assumption from the 
first in the way I have indicated, thereby generating their respective combination problems. 
So, let us now see what we can do about rejecting the First Assumption on behalf of the 
panpsychist. I will argue that a phenomenally-qualitied ultimate is not ipso facto a mind or 
subject of experience, even for the panpsychist. This will clear the way for us to see how 
phenomenal combination might be possible.  
 
 
3. Phenomenally-Qualitied Ultimates are not themselves Minds or Subjects of Experience 
There is a Quick Argument that will take us to the conclusion that the panpsychist’s 
phenomenally-qualitied ultimates are subjects of experience in their own right. I speculate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The same goes for the discussion of the combination problem in Goff 2009a, and the concept of subject is also 
essential to Goff’s (2009b) panpsychic zombie argument, as we will see. This vindicates my decision to treat 
‘mind’ and ‘subject’ as equivalent. 
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that this argument provides the reason why many panpsychists hold that the ultimates must be 
subjects, but I will show it to be unsound. Panpsychists should not in fact be moved by the 
argument; and being so unmoved, they will be able to reject the First Assumption.  
 
The Quick Argument proceeds from a natural claim concerning phenomenal qualities, 
namely that where they exist they must be experienced by some subject. ‘There cannot be 
experience without an experiencer’, it is said.18 The next step is simply to apply this apparent 
truism to the panpsychist’s ultimates. On panpsychism, phenomenally-qualitied ultimates 
compose the entire material universe. Very many, the vast majority, of those ultimates will 
therefore exist outside of any commonly-recognisable subjects such as ourselves or higher 
animals. A great deal of them will just be composing interstellar clouds of gas, for example. 
But it will not do, on the present conception, to have instances of phenomenal quality existing 
without being experienced by anyone at all. So the requirement that every instance of 
phenomenal quality be attached to a subject works to press each phenomenally-qualitied 
ultimate into service as its own subject. Each ultimate must experience (at least) its own 
phenomenal qualities. That is the only way to guarantee that there are no unexperienced 
phenomenal qualities floating around.19 Result: every panpsychic ultimate is a subject. That’s 
an awful lot of subjects, I take it, by anybody’s lights. 
 
Let us face some facts. As a panpsychist, one’s options are to say that there are 
phenomenally-qualitied ultimates everywhere, and that there are also, consequently, subjects 
of experience literally everywhere, or, on the other hand, to deny that being phenomenally-
qualitied suffices for being a subject of experience. Quite aside from how this will help us 
with the phenomenal combination problems in the long run, panpsychists should wish to 
avoid the Subjects Everywhere claim, I think, for the sake of the credibility of their position. 
If the cost of solving the mind-body problem is that there are subjects everywhere, it is not a 
cost most philosophers will ever want to pay, nor is it a cost that we should pay. Panpsychism 
has been unfairly likened to the ‘metastasising’ of the problem of consciousness throughout 
the universe.20 The charge is however a fair one when the solution to how there can be minds 
in a material world is simply to say that all the bits of material are minds already. We really 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Strawson has argued in this way, see his 2003. He is also committed to the argument’s conclusion. 
19 For the argument to cover those ultimates composing ourselves and other clear-cut subjects, we simply have 
to note that any of our current ultimates can, and at some point does, exist in isolated form (e.g. before and after 
we exist). 
20 A friend of a friend said this I’m told, as is the way with these things. 
14	  
	  
should want to say something remotely interesting about how minds come about, not simply 
take them so thoroughly for granted.21 It is not just that this position is implausible, it is that 
solving practically any problem in this way is fundamentally boring. In fact this sort of 
manoeuvre is boring in such a deeply metaphysical way that this alone indicates, from what 
we know of the workings of the world, that what we have on our hands is far from the correct 
solution. The version of panpsychism I favour does not run this risk: it has an interesting and 
substantive generation story to tell when it comes to conscious minds as we know them. We 
will come to an abridged version of this story in due course.22 
These reasons do not constitute the only, or by any means the most important, ground 
for rejecting the thesis that the panpsychist’s ultimates are subjects, however. The main 
reason for rejecting the thesis is that there is an incoherence involved in the idea of essentially 
phenomenally-qualitied ultimates which, of necessity, provide their own subjects of 
experience. Before arguing for this claim, I would like to call upon some moral support. 
Although the great weight of philosophers undoubtedly hold that phenomenal qualities 
cannot exist without subjects to experience them, I am in decent company in rejecting this 
claim. Lockwood (1989), Rosenthal (1991), Foster (2000), Rosenberg (2004), Unger (2006), 
Leibniz (1714/1991), and Hume (1739/1978) all seem to agree with me.23  
The argument I want to develop is based upon an argument due to Foster, against a 
certain conception of the sense-data theory of perception (Foster 2000, Ch. 3.5). On the 
conception of sense-data in question, they are sensory entities that purport to be externally-
located objects. For example, one such sense-datum may be a red-coloured object in the 
visual field that purports to be a red London bus. In experiencing the sense-datum the subject 
is invited to believe that there is a red London bus before her. The details and feasibility of 
the mechanism by which subjects are said to perceive the outside world on the sense-data 
theory need not concern us, however. What concerns us is the claim, which Foster attacks as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This applies even if, as a referee suggests, the ultimate-minds are minds of a ‘more basic’ sort than ours, 
whatever this means.  
22 All my panpsychism takes for granted is phenomenal qualities, not minds. Isn’t this position equally 
vulnerable to the ‘boringness’ objection, however? Shouldn’t we seek to derive phenomenal qualities too, 
instead of transplanting them into micro-ontology? It’s a question of what is and what isn’t derivable, is the 
answer. I hold that phenomenal qualities are not derivable from quality-less underpinnings, for the usual reasons. 
In contrast, I have a story—as promised a short version features shortly—that will take us from subjectless 
phenomenal ultimates to minds/subjects. So I believe that my position metaphysically takes for granted the bare 
minimum, which is the most we can aspire to. 
23 Unger seems to be able to make sense of the idea of subjectless phenomenal qualities. And Leibnizian monads 
are phenomenally qualitied but are decidedly not minds. Hume, famously, detected many phenomenal elements 
in his consciousness, but not even one subject. 
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incoherent, that a sense-datum is to be understood as a sensory item whose existence is 
restricted to the episode of being experienced by the subject in question. As Foster explains 
this conception of sense-data   
 
for each sense-datum x, there is an episode of presentational awareness y, such 
that x is the object of y, and the fact of x’s being the object of y fully covers, 
and necessarily covers, all that is involved in the occurrence of x as a concrete 
ingredient of reality. (Foster 2000, 164) 
 
There are two important disanalogies to be noted between sense-data and (instances of) 
phenomenal qualities; nonetheless I submit that the core of Foster’s characterisation of sense-
data applies to phenomenal qualities, as they are conceived under the Quick Argument. The 
disanalogies are as follows: First, phenomenal qualities are not objects in the way that sense-
data are hypothesised to be; phenomenal qualities are rather properties of objects—for 
example of panpsychic ultimates. Second, phenomenal qualities need not—at least, not in the 
absence of further argument—be construed as perceptual objects, as on an act-object model 
of perceptual experience. Nevertheless, we can say the following about phenomenal qualities, 
which confirms that Foster’s description indeed applies to them in the salient respects: 
Phenomenal qualities are real features of the world which, on the present hypothesis, cannot 
exist except in so far as some subject is aware of them. They are not objects of which the 
subject is aware after an act-object model. Nonetheless they are real constituents of reality of 
which the subject is aware in having perceptual experience. If we are realists about 
phenomenal properties—which the panpsychist must be—then of (for instance) a given 
instantiation of phenomenal redness, it is straightforward to say that in having an experiential 
episode involving this phenomenal redness a certain subject is aware of the redness; of what 
it is like, its phenomenal quality. The thesis that phenomenal qualities cannot exist 
unexperienced implies that episodes of awareness of phenomenal qualities by subjects 
positively exhaust their being as ontological items, and necessarily so. Thus the being of this 
instance of phenomenal redness does not outrun the subject’s awareness of it; its nature as an 
ingredient of reality is necessarily exhausted by figuring in this awareness. So the core of 
Foster’s account of sense-data indeed applies to phenomenal qualities, as presently conceived. 
What, then, is wrong with the notion of existents whose being is restricted to, and so 
exhausted by, episodes of awareness by subjects? According to Foster, such an item will 
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either derive its existence from figuring in such awareness, or else its existence will consist in, 
will take the form of, figuring in such awareness. But neither of these possibilities is coherent. 
The first option amounts to saying that the fact of the existence of the item is constituted by 
the fact of its figuring in the awareness of a given subject of experience. Yet this idea, of one 
fact being constituted by another fact, clearly requires the obtaining of both facts 
independently of one another, logically speaking. The item cannot derive its existence from 
figuring in awareness unless it already exists, in a logically prior sense. For unless the item 
exists in a logically prior sense, there is simply nothing that is available for the subject to be 
aware of. Therefore, an existent cannot derive its being from the fact of figuring in the 
awareness of a subject. That would be deriving its existence from a fact that concerned itself, 
without the need first to exist, which is incoherent.  
The second option is not so blatantly incoherent as the first: it amounts to saying that 
the precise mode of being of the existent in question lies in its figuring in an episode of 
awareness; phenomenal qualities are to be thought of as essentially presentational items. The 
problem here is that this idea violates our conception of what awareness involves. Awareness 
is a relation between two items: a is aware of b. But this presupposes that b has a logically 
possible existence outside of a’s being aware of it (and so outside of awareness in general). 
This is just to say, in Foster’s words, that in a case of awareness there exists something ‘on 
which the awareness can get purchase’ (Foster 2000,168). It is incoherent to suppose that the 
existence of a certain token of phenomenal redness simply consists in a subject’s awareness 
of it. For unless the token of phenomenal redness had a claim to existence outside of this 
awareness, there would exist nothing, no feature of reality, for the subject to be aware of in 
the first place. A subject could not be said to become aware of an instance of phenomenal 
redness if the phenomenal redness did not exist except in so far as the subject was already 
aware of it. This is not a point concerning temporal priority, but concerning logical priority. If 
the quality were so built in to the episode of awareness, then it could not properly be 
something of which the subject was aware. Rather, the property, the phenomenal redness in 
this case, could at most be a modification of the awareness itself. Thus ‘phenomenally red’ 
would characterise a manner of being aware (of something other than the phenomenal 
redness).  The episode of awareness in question would really be a case of being-aware-redly, 
with the phenomenal redness restricted to an adverbial form of existence. But this situation 
would not be one in which the subject could be said to be aware of a phenomenal quality, 
phenomenal redness, as such. If I drive slowly, for instance, that does not imply that there is a 
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property of slowness belonging to the event of driving. All it means is that I drove in a certain 
way.24 The aim of adverbialism is precisely to do away with instantiated phenomenal 
qualities as such.25 Now, adverbial approaches to sensory quality may be appealing to those 
desirous to avoid the reifying tendencies of the sense-datum theory, but as a means of 
understanding the nature of phenomenal properties they are not available to the panpsychist. 
The panpsychist must understand phenomenal properties to be real qualities, not mere 
adverbial modifications—manners of sensing. For phenomenal qualities are, on panpsychism, 
the world-building intrinsic natures of the ultimates. Adjectival—not mere adverbial—
existence is what is called for. The panpsychist is committed to phenomenal properties as 
Blockean mental paint, in other words.26 
The upshot of our Foster-inspired ‘Independence Argument’ is this. Phenomenal 
qualities, as the panpsychist conceives of them, cannot be of a nature such that they are 
necessarily restricted to episodes of awareness of them by subjects. In order to be the sort of 
real qualities of which a subject could come to be aware at all, phenomenal qualities must 
have a logically possible life outside of figuring in episodes of awareness.27 There simply 
cannot be a property, a real feature of reality, which gains its existence precisely and only 
through someone’s awareness of it. Not even the property of being an experience is of that 
sort. For an experience’s being what it is does not derive from or consist in anyone’s 
awareness of it; rather, experiences are those happenings via which we can be aware of 
anything at all. Therefore, the first premise of the Quick Argument, that phenomenal qualities 
cannot exist unexperienced, is false. In fact, phenomenal qualities must (logically) be capable 
of existing unexperienced. 
 (A pair of parenthetical postscripts to the Independence Argument:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 C.f. Van Steenburgh ‘'Quickly' specifies the action intended, not by property ascription, but by contrast 
with 'slowly'’ (1987, 378). 
25 C.f. Butchvarov’s explication of adverbialism ‘Let us take the example “Something appears white to me” and 
its paraphrase as “I am appeared whitely to”. We must keep in mind that we are asked [by the adverbialist] to 
understand the latter in such a way that it does not entail…that something is white.’ (1980, 256). If nothing is 
white, then there is no whiteness, and no phenomenal quality as such.  
26 It is not always clear that adverbialists eschew mental paint: consider this statement by Broad ‘It is about 
equally plausible to analyse a sensation of a sweet taste into an act of sensing and a sweet sensum, or to treat it 
as an unanalysable mental fact, having no object, but possessing the property of sweetness.’ (1923, 254-255). 
But if the mental occurrence possesses sweetness, then the quality sweetness belongs to it; it is not a mere 
matter of experiencing after a sweet manner. Perhaps Broad’s view is in fact closer to what Jackson 1976 calls 
the ‘state theory’, as distinct from adverbialism proper.  
27 Hartshorne sees the same point from the reverse angle: ‘Experience, awareness, is never simply of itself, but 
is always a response to a given….Experience is a partly free, self-creative response, not to that very experience 
but to something else which must be there to make the experience possible.’ (1974, 471). 
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i. There’s a debate about the location of phenomenal qualities like colours: do they exist only 
as mental features, or are they features of external objects? The naïve realist thinks that 
phenomenal colour qualities are contributed to perceptual experience by external objects, 
whose properties they properly are. Nobody who has this conception of phenomenal colour 
qualities imagines that they depend upon our awareness of them—that their existence is 
restricted to episodes of human (or animal) phenomenal consciousness and exhausted by 
figuring in such episodes. Colours, by common sense, are capable of going on existing 
whether or not they figure in some subject’s awareness. Now, whether phenomenal colour 
qualities are construed as internal or external makes no odds on this matter. Either way they 
can be real, and more or less physical, properties. The idea of real properties restricted to and 
exhausted by episodes of awareness of them by subjects is unacceptable when phenomenal 
colour qualities are construed as external. This would constitute their disappearance as real 
qualitative properties, and their re-incarnation as mere phantoms. The move is just as 
unacceptable when they are construed as internal, and for the same reason. This is not to say 
that every possible phenomenal quality exists for eternity whether experienced or not. There 
is no need to say that. What is required is just that phenomenal qualities not be of necessity 
restricted to episodes of awareness of them; that their nature guarantees them a logically 
possible existence outside of these episodes. This is what they need to be real features of 
reality and potential qualifiers of experiential episodes. 
ii. Common sense makes ample conceptual room for unexperienced phenomenal qualities. 
For instance, it seems that one can be woken up by a pain (or sound). But to be woken up—
brought to consciousness—by a pain requires that the pain exists before you come to 
awareness of it. If we balk and say that a physical correlate of the pain woke you, then we 
deny that the pain qua pain woke you. For the pain qua pain to wake you, i.e. on account of 
its quality, that quality had to have existed unexperienced. The other option, of claiming that 
we are only ever woken by pains when already phenomenally conscious of them in dreams, is 
a strained alternative not demanded by our commonsense conception.) 
With the rejection of the first premise of the Quick Argument, that phenomenal 
qualities cannot exist unexperienced, we are now also able to reject its conclusion, that every 
phenomenally-qualitied ultimate is a subject. Having phenomenal qualities does not entail 
that an ultimate is a subject, for there is now no metaphysical requirement to secure the 
constant experiencing of every instance of phenomenal quality in existence. Consequently, 
the panpsychist is now free to canvass the idea of phenomenally-qualitied ultimates which are 
19	  
	  
not subjects. She may, therefore, reject the First Assumption underlying the combination 
problems. 
 
4. Mental Chemistry (or: Phenomenal Bonding28) 
With the rejection of the First Assumption, that phenomenally-qualitied ultimates are 
themselves subjects of experience, we have cleared the way towards seeing how phenomenal 
combination might be possible. I have argued that what was motivating the endorsement of 
the Second Assumption by proponents of the combination problem, that phenomenal 
assembly could only be aggregative, was prior endorsement of the thesis that phenomenally-
qualitied ultimates are subjects.29 For the essentially discrete nature of subjects (minds, 
phenomenal perspectives) was taken to ensure that no amount of Jamesian ‘shuffling’ could 
genuinely integrate them. But if phenomenally-qualitied ultimates needn’t be subjects, as I 
have argued, then support for the claim that phenomenal assembly could only be aggregative 
disappears. We are now free to describe a positive conception of phenomenally-qualitied 
ultimates on which they can do much more than just aggregate. What is that conception? It is 
the job of this section to evoke it, and then to speculate as to the mechanics of phenomenal 
combination. We also need to say something about how genuine subjects, beings like 
ourselves, arise on the present picture. 
 
As a first step, the conception we are going to be in the business of developing has a 
pair of salient features that we can indicate in the abstract. What we want to imagine are 
phenomenally-qualitied entities, but entities that are not themselves subjects of experience, 
and whose qualities are perfectly capable of existing unexperienced. To help us arrive at a 
positive conception of such entities I want to appeal to some of our commonsense thinking 
about colour, as it putatively exists as an external, mind-independent feature of the world. We, 
in the everyday mode, think of objects as straightforwardly coloured. For example, we think 
of a red London bus as being straightforwardly red, much as if the redness were painted over 
the surface of the bus in a quite objective way (of course, what accounts for the redness of the 
‘paint’ is something we don’t consider, in this mode). As part of this conception, we take it, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 This term is Goff’s (see his 2009b). I prefer ‘mental chemistry’ because, as alluded to earlier, the ingredients 
in a chemical composition are intrinsically changed by being assembled, which is an essential feature of genuine 
composition on the present understanding. This feature is also important to the mechanics of our model of 
phenomenal combination, as we see below. Mere bonding doesn’t carry this implication.  
29 Endorsement on behalf of the panpsychist, of course, for whose internal position the first assumption was 
supposed to produce difficulties. 
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in an easy and uncomplicated way, that the bus is still red when we are not looking at it, and 
even when no-one is looking at it, as when it is waiting in its garage overnight. What is the 
form of this conception of the bus as still red even when unobserved? If pressed on this point, 
we are likely to say something like that the bus has just the quality it has when we are looking 
at it, it is still being red, ‘radiating’ redness in a sense, even when no-one is there to enjoy it. 
It is natural to go dispositional next: to say that the bus is such that were someone there to see 
it, it would look red to them. But we only employ such a dispositional way of thinking, I 
believe, to home in on an occurrent quality we unreflectively consider the bus to have, viz. 
that of being red in an ongoing, positive way. We have, on the commonsense way of thinking, 
no difficulty with the notion of qualities which exist with no-one there to experience them.30 I 
suggest we use this commonsense model to think now about unexperienced instances of 
phenomenal quality. We can, to take a next step, attempt to imagine a patch of phenomenal 
red,31 now as experienced by one of us, now as experienced by nobody, but still ‘radiating’ 
redness, much as we take the lonesome red London bus to do.32 Next, consider that this 
phenomenal redness permeates the spherical volume of a particle, a panpsychic ultimate.33 
We have not yet been forced to think of this ultimate as itself a subject, and we must resist 
any temptation to do so at this stage. If we have got this far, we are well on the way to a 
positive conception of the required phenomenally-qualitied ultimates. We need only note that 
the account given so far in terms of phenomenal colours is artificially restricted. I think we 
find it easiest to conceptualise in terms of these colours, but we must allow that the 
phenomenal qualities of the ultimates, especially those not engaged in constituting human 
beings, may be quite alien to the qualities we are acquainted with. Phenomenal colours, as 
used in our conceivings, are really just analogous to the true phenomenal natures of the 
ultimates.34  Many will no doubt feel that the notion of unexperienced phenomenal qualities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Smells provide another good example: if a bad smell lingers in a place, we tend to think of the unpleasant 
scent hanging around, i.e. that very quality we detect when we smell it, even when nobody happens to be where 
the smell is. 
31	  I.e. a quality that can figure in phenomenal consciousness, as distinguished from the commonsensical (and 
perhaps non-existent, if popular dispositional accounts of external colours are correct) redness of the bus. 
32 Care is needed with the idea of ‘radiating’ in this context, however. For phenomenal redness, as a quality of 
an ultimate, is not—or need not be—a property that affects light rays, in the way that surfaces of red objects do. 
Therefore it is not a property that is visible to us in the normal way. Access to phenomenal qualities can only 
come from inside the system to which the quality in question belongs. I turn to this point in a moment, in 
connection with the composition of subjects. By ‘radiating’ here, I therefore mean only to indicate that the patch 
is phenomenally red in an ongoing, positive—i.e. not merely dispositional—way. 
33 I have firmly in mind here the sorts of imagining Unger asks us to engage in throughout his 2006. 
Phenomenal colours are very useful for such conceiving, because they seem to fill space in a straightforward 
way.  
34 Of course there will be some ultimates whose phenomenal quality we know perfectly well: viz. those currently 
composing our conscious field, perhaps on the model that comes shortly below. 
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is absurd. But I take it that with the support I have provided for the notion (the Independence 
Argument above, and now this exercise in positive conceiving) the onus is on these 
philosophers to provide some argument for their claim.35 Otherwise one suspects that they are 
simply giving vent to a philosophical prejudice.  
It must be said that with respect to the dialectic the main part of our story is now 
complete: we have disposed of the notion that the panpsychist’s ultimates must be the 
subjects of their own phenomenal quality, and have made some effort towards arriving at a 
positive conception of the subjectless phenomenally-qualitied ultimates. Since the main 
obstacle to phenomenal combination was the assumption that panpsychic ultimates are 
subjects, we have effectively done enough to dissolve the combination problems. As against 
Block/Stoljar, whereas the combination of minds might be impossible, there is nothing 
obvious to get in the way of the combination of subjectless phenomenal ultimates. As against 
Goff, we will not detect a phenomenal aggregate in introspecting consciousness just because 
no mere phenomenal aggregate is present. What there is instead, what each of our 
phenomenal perspectives is constituted of, is the smooth integration of a horde of 
phenomenal ultimates: a phenomenal unity, made possible by their subjectless nature. 
Still, someone might reasonably ask at this point that we provide something in the 
way of a positive conception of the combination of the phenomenally-qualitied ultimates just 
conceived, as well as of the relation between these ultimates and the conscious minds 
(subjects, phenomenal perspectives) they compose. What comes below is not in its details 
essential to the present treatment of the combination problem—I take the essential part of that 
treatment to consist in our disposal of the First Assumption—so it should be taken by 
interested theorists as a possibly useful, but by no means compulsory, piece of speculation as 
to how progress might be made towards satisfying completion of our metaphysical picture. 
Of course some positive conception or other of phenomenal combination will have to be 
provided by a theory of the present sort. But since there are a variety of ways that such a 
conception might be filled out, what follows serves, at a minimum, only to indicate the 
possibility of such an account. 
To take us towards the combination of the panpsychic ultimates just conceived, the 
metaphor-model I will appeal to is that of paint patches on a canvass. Paint patches, as freshly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The literature is conspicuously light on any argument to this effect, instead authors typically invoke the 
apparent truism that phenomenal qualities cannot exist unexperienced and proceed from there. 
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painted on, are qualitative elements: here a dab of red, there a splodge of green, over there a 
blue-ish blotch. They helpfully resemble phenomenally-qualitied ultimates, as presently 
imagined: we just described three distinct qualitative items—paint patches—each 
individuated by its quality and position, much as we could have isolated three different 
phenomenally-coloured patches of your visual field now, or three phenomenally-qualitied 
basic particles. Paint patches are distinct items, distinguished in much the way that we 
distinguish instantiations of colour qualia. But they are not fenced off from one another, nor 
is their only possible mode of arrangement aggregative. A Seurat is an example of the mere 
aggregation of paint patches: in La Grande Jatte every point of paint remains separate from 
the others; it is distance from the canvass that leads us to see a unified image in the pointillist 
style. Goya’s La Maja Desnuda, a more painterly painting, is quite different. Goya’s flesh 
tones are remarkable, the warmth of skin, the richness of the rendering of his beloved’s 
colouring, but also the transparency; the hint of a blue vein here, the tense line of a muscle, a 
little darker, there. Goya’s paint patches are perfectly integrated, together a unity; the colour 
of the Maja at any point is either a pure ‘plodge’ of paint put down on the canvass, or is the 
result of blending with the paint immediately surrounding. To be more precise, we can 
discern three ways in which the paint patches exist in integrated form with one another. A 
given paint patch, first, may be the result of the mixing of two (or more) distinctly hued paint 
plodges: in this case the prior qualities cease to exist in their former independent state, 
persisting in the qualitative traces they contribute to the unified patch they have formed. 
Second, two distinct patches may overlap one another, by being blended into one another at 
the edges. At the point of interface these patches intrinsically alter one another’s quality, 
producing some new, related, quality as upshot. Third, two patches may exist side by side, or 
some distance away from one another, without there being any obvious qualitative interaction 
between them. However, when we consider their integration into the qualitative field—the 
canvass—as a whole, we can note the connection between them. Each contributes to the 
overall qualitative impact of the canvass, and they may affect each other without having to 
mix: what the phenomenon of the non-transitivity of colour-similarity confirms is that the 
juxtaposition of colours of different hues affects the overall quality experienced. In painting, 
one deploys qualitative elements which can, in arrangement, alter one another’s intrinsic 
character. This mutual conditioning is part and parcel of the integration of the qualitative 
elements into a whole, with systemic powers all its own: the overall phenomenological 
upshot of all the composing elements. Qualitatively distinct elements can combine into a 
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smoothly variegated qualitative whole. This, a painted canvass, is the model I suggest we 
have in mind when we think of phenomenal combination.36 
We are already perfectly well aware of phenomenal combination, if we care to think 
about it. One drinks a decent red wine with the Sunday roast beef because the flavours of 
roast beef and red wine pleasingly interpenetrate. Each flavour in isolation is a distinct 
phenomenal element. Their coming together yields a whole qualitatively distinct from either 
of the parts, though the combinatory upshot of their properties. This happens through the two 
elements fusing together, forming a genuine phenomenal unity which is the logical product of 
its ingredients. This is the model for a phenomenally composite, but not merely aggregative, 
state.37 
Suppose that on panpsychism some subset of the ultimates composing a person, 
perhaps those realising the relevant parts of her brain, are those which constitute her 
conscious field, her phenomenal perspective. A human subject’s overall phenomenal state at 
a given time, then, I take to be the combination of the phenomenal characters of these 
individual ultimates. Pace James, and Block/Stoljar, and Goff (and Leibniz), each 
phenomenal ultimate does not (or need not) remain ‘in the sum, what it always was’. Rather, 
the phenomenal ultimates mutually condition one another, as they phenomenally fuse. They 
form a phenomenal unity, composed of a phenomenal multitude, where the quality of the 
whole is the logical product of the qualities of the ingredients.38 This complex unity, once 
formed, is responsive to (through being able to represent, through being structured) states 
internal and external to it. There will now be top-down conditioning of the quality of the 
composing ultimates, through modification by the senses and internal system dynamics (e.g. 
cognitive interactions). Such a unity is, I suggest, properly designated a ‘subject’ or ‘mind’.  
However, it may well seem that I am not entitled to use of the term ‘subject’ at this 
point. For was not the whole point of the Independence Argument to banish subjects from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 What we have just considered is synchronous combination: the composition of a qualitative field at a moment. 
The same idea of the overlap of qualitative instances may also plausibly be used to account for the ongoing 
unity of a phenomenal field over time: qualitative instances succeeding one another may overlap in the way that 
co-existing instances do as they compose a field. James gestures at this diachronic version of qualitative overlap 
in his 1909, though he strangely finds himself having to give up on logic to allow phenomenal combination. 
This is because he fails to see, as yet, that the ultimates need not be subjects. 
37 What are the rules of phenomenal combination? That is, what is the logic that takes qualitative instances x and 
y and produces qualitatively-different instance z, for example? I simply don’t know. But I do not need to know. 
My present task is only to show how phenomenal combination might be possible. The combinatory rulebook is 
something that remains to be investigated.  
38 Again, according to rules I don’t pretend to grasp as yet. 
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panpsychist’s micro-ontology? In that case we have, it seems, generated a new sort of 
explanatory gap. We may have explained (in principle) how phenomenally-qualitied items 
can combine, but we must also explain how subjectless items give rise to a subject. How do 
we get subjectivity out of the subjectless? 
The answer to this important question—important because if we cannot answer it the 
whole panpsychist explanatory project is back to square one—lies in proper consideration of 
the ontology we are building. On panpsychism, the phenomenal quality of a system is 
something available only from inside the system. As Hartshorne ably puts the point: ‘Viewed 
from without, or through the sense organs, the psychical [phenomenal] appears as behavior, 
but from within, or in itself, it is feeling, memory, anticipation, and the like.’ (1977: xx) The 
notion of ‘within’ here is to be captured by the concept of constitution. The manifold 
phenomenal quality of a conscious system is accessible only to that system because the 
phenomenal quality in question is, through being carried by the relevant ultimates, 
constitutive of that system. For experiencers looking on from outside, the internal 
phenomenal character of another system is inaccessible. Since these outside observers are not 
constituted by any of the ultimates that carry the phenomenal quality of the foreign system, 
they cannot experience said quality. They can only be causally affected by the alien system, 
which is not to have access to its intrinsic quality. This is just to capture the essential 
closedness of minds/subjects that we noted earlier in discussion of our combination problems, 
particularly the Block/Stoljar problem. It is, further, the essentially structured (composite) 
nature of the phenomenally-qualitied systems posited that enables them to be subjects of their 
own phenomenal qualities, something beyond the reach of simple ultimates. A system 
composed of phenomenally-qualitied parts may utilise some of those parts to carry 
information about, to represent, the phenomenal quality of other parts. I hypothesise that the 
phenomenal representation by one phenomenally-qualitied item of the phenomenal quality of 
another such item occurs through the first item taking on the phenomenal quality of the 
second. The capacity of the first item to take on the quality of the second item will be enabled, 
the idea goes, by the two items being suitably causally related within the structure of the 
subject. Such causal relating, we may speculate, is a good deal of what the brain is for. 
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Conscious awareness as we know it is therefore to be thought of as phenomenal 
representation, the representation of phenomenal quality by phenomenal quality.39 Further 
pursuing the speculative thread, here is a sketch of a model of perceptual consciousness for 
one of the subjects we are contemplating. The subject’s body has senses (there is nothing 
problematic about this, it’s just the idea of the panpsychist’s ultimates composing part of our 
conventionally-conceived material world). The visual sense, to simplify the case, is attached 
to a phenomenal screen, we might theorise. The phenomenal screen is a lattice of ultimates 
(in the brain) arranged so that their corporate phenomenal quality is a function of the input 
from the visual sense. So the idea would be that when confronted with a red thing in suitable 
light, the signal propagated to the phenomenal screen causes it to turn phenomenal red. 
Subjectival awareness of this perceptual representation is then accomplished by the 
aforementioned mechanism of phenomenal representation: a second phenomenal screen, this 
time corresponding to the central perceptual/experiential domain of the subject, receives a 
signal from the visual screen, and represents what it finds there, i.e. it turns, in some portion, 
phenomenally red also. This central screen, however, also receives inputs from the other 
externally-facing senses and their respective phenomenal representations, and from ‘screens’ 
responsive to the internal (proprioceptive, emotional, etc.) states of the system too. As these 
are registered in the central subject-screen, we build up a phenomenal representation of the 
complex state of the whole system, the organism. This phenomenal representation of 
phenomenality, connected to decision-making and motor circuits, appropriately insulated and 
identified through its constitutional boundary, and able to carry information about the 
environment, to act upon this information, and to exist as a standalone locus of executive 
representational phenomenality, in contradistinction from other such systems populating the 
landscape, is our subject, I propose. To be such a representational system is to be conscious 
in the way that we recognise each in our own case.  This is only the briefest sketch of how to 
go about it, but I hope I have said enough for us to be able to see one way in which the 
conceptual bridge might be built from subjectless ultimates to subjects as we know them. 
 
5. Goff’s Panpsychic Zombie Argument 
Goff has recently proposed a formidable argument against panpsychism (Goff, 2009b), in 
addition to his epistemic version of the combination problem that we dealt with above. In this 
section I will address this argument in the light of our discussion so far, by wielding against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 What we have here is a sort of higher-order thought theory of consciousness, with the phenomenal qualities of 
the represented and representing states taken as irreducible.  
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Goff the philosophical resources we have developed. This will achieve the aims of offering a 
much-needed response to Goff’s argument, providing a testing ground for our account, and 
will also help us to understand better the conception of panpsychism presently being 
proposed. 
 
The focal point of Goff’s argument is panpsychism’s claim to account for the 
conscious state of a being such as one of us. This overall state of creature consciousness, 
corresponding more or less to what we have described as the phenomenal perspective of a 
given person, Goff labels ‘o-consciousness’ (‘o’ for organism). Through clever adaptation of 
the zombie argument against physicalism, Goff aims to show that panpsychism cannot 
explain o-consciousness. If Goff’s argument is sound we would be back to where we were at 
the outset, when we fretted over the combination problems. If panpsychism faces the 
explanatory lacuna suggested, then it loses its key source of appeal and is left dialectically 
adrift with respect to its more conventional physicalist competitors. In such a situation 
panpsychism’s ascription of phenomenality to the ultimates comes to look decidedly 
ontologically overblown, and the theory is most likely to be abandoned. 
Goff imagines just the situation I described in the previous section, whereby the 
relevant (consciousness determining) part of the brain of one of us is constituted by 
phenomenally-qualitied ultimates. The subject we will concentrate on is Goff himself. His 
phenomenal perspective is to be characterised as follows: ‘a unified experience of feeling 
cold, tired, smelling roast beef, etc.’ (2009, 13). Goff further imagines that at least one of the 
ultimates involved in constituting his consciousness instantiates phenomenal coldness, one or 
more others instantiate the quality of tiredness, and some others instantiate the smell of roast 
beef (and so on). In other words, for each phenomenal element making up his overall o-
conscious phenomenal perspective, Goff asks us to imagine that there is an ultimate (or 
ultimates) belonging to the consciousness-constituting part of his brain which instantiate the 
relevant quality. So far this sounds very much like the picture we were developing above of 
the phenomenal composition of a phenomenal perspective. 
However, Goff claims that it is perfectly conceivable that his ultimates should have 
the qualities described, while he himself does not enjoy the unified experience of feeling cold, 
tired and smelling roast beef. In fact, he says, it seems conceivable that his ultimates could 
have the qualities described while he enjoys no o-consciousness at all. Thus the Goff we are 
imagining might well be a panpsychic zombie: a creature with just the phenomenal setup the 
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panpsychist assures us provides for and explains the fact of o-consciousness, but which lacks 
any such o-consciousness. We need not worry whether panpsychic zombies are possible; if 
they are even conceivable then panpsychism loses its claim to be able to account for 
consciousness in superior fashion to physicalism.40  
The panpsychic zombie argument would not be an especially strong one if it 
depended on the bare claim that given the panpsychist’s favoured arrangement of 
phenomenally-qualitied ultimates, still a zombie remains conceivable. For what would result 
would likely express a mere clash of intuitions: the panpsychist is liable to insist that if the 
relevant ultimates have the requisite qualities then it is impossible for the imagined Goff to 
lack o-consciousness, while the proponent of the panpsychic zombie argument will simply 
demur. Even the zombie argument against physicalism does not rest on a bare claim of 
physical zombie conceivability: instead that argument, indeed the zombie thought experiment, 
depends upon some important further considerations. In the case of the anti-physicalist 
zombie argument the relevant further reasoning is in essence that since consciousness is not a 
functional property, no physical/functional configuration can guarantee its instantiation; 
indeed every such configuration will seem compatible with its absence: hence the 
conceivability of physical zombies.41  
What is the corresponding further reasoning underpinning Goff’s panpsychic zombie 
argument? In an important passage, Goff says 
 
my o-experience is a different conscious experience with a different phenomenal 
character to each of the conscious experiences I am supposing to be had by each of my 
ultimates in this example. One of my ultimates has an experience as of feeling cold, 
one has an experience as of feeling tired, one has an experience as of smelling roast 
beef, etc, whilst my o-experience is an experience as of having a unified experience of 
feeling cold, tired and smelling roast beef, etc. The existence of a subject having a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 As Goff (2009b) notes, an ‘a posteriori panpsychism’ that modelled the connection between consciousness 
and its realising base after a posteriori physicalism, i.e. positing a brutely necessary a posteriori connection 
with no transparent conception attached to it (thus allowing for the conceivability of zombies but not their 
metaphysical possibility), would be distinctly unsatisfying (not to mention prone to attack on the basis of 
parsimony considerations). It is the modus operandi of panpsychism to proffer an explanation of the generation 
of consciousness. (see Papineau 2002 for an example of a posteriori physicalism, based on considerations 
relating to the special nature of phenomenal concepts). 
41 I have in mind especially Chalmers’s (1996) influential formulation of the zombie argument. See also Kirk 
1974 for an earlier formulation. Zombies seem to trace back (like much else) to Leibniz, specifically to his mill 
analogy (1714/1991, 70). This led Leibniz to say that phenomenality (‘perception’) must be present in the parts 
that make a mind, since it could never appear through the interaction of non-phenomenal parts. Having thus 
sensibly embarked on the road to panpsychism, Leibniz promptly gave unfortunate early birth to the 
combination problem, by stipulating that his ‘windowless’ monads could not combine.    
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unified experience of feeling cold and tired and smelling roast beef does not seem to 
be a priori entailed by the existence of a subject that feels cold, a subject that feels 
tired, and a subject that smells roast beef. (Goff 2009b, 14) 
 
To make complete sense of Goff’s argument we need, next, to consider a principle he 
introduces, the principle of ‘no summing of subjects’, or NSS 
 
(NSS): The existence of a number (one or more) of subjects of experience with certain 
phenomenal characters, never a priori entails the existence of any other subject of 
experience (Goff 2009b, 17) 
 
And now we can see the whole shape of Goff’s argument, neatly encapsulated by him as 
follows 
 
I commit myself to a large number of subjects of experience, each instantiating their 
own conscious experience with a determinate phenomenal character…I imagine a 
subject of experience that feels cold, a subject that feels tired, a subject that smells 
roast beef, etc. But…I don’t seem to commit myself to the existence of any subjects of 
experience beyond the basic experiencing ultimates themselves. As NSS states, the 
existence of a certain number of subjects of experience with certain phenomenal 
characters does not entail the existence of any other subject of experience. (Goff 
2009b, 18) 
 
Summary: Thanks to NSS, the panpsychist’s favoured arrangement of phenomenally-
qualitied ultimates composing Goff’s brain is fully compatible with the absence of the 
relevant o-consciousness, Goff’s phenomenal perspective. Hence panpsychic zombies are 
conceivable, and panpsychism loses its claim to account for o-consciousness. 
It thus turns out that it is crucial to the panpsychic zombie argument to conceive of the 
panpsychic ultimates composing a phenomenal perspective as themselves subjects of 
experience. For NSS is a thesis about subjects of consciousness, about what is entailed (or not) 
by the arrangement of subjects. And, just as was made so vivid by Block’s microscopic aliens 
thought experiment earlier, nothing seems to follow from the assembly of subjects, in 
whichever way, concerning some further state of consciousness putatively comprising those 
subjects. I have no quarrel with principle NSS, it seems intuitively true and is confirmed by 
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what we have said concerning the metaphysical status of subjects (minds, phenomenal 
perspectives) earlier on: namely that subjects are fundamentally fenced off from one another, 
each windowless with respect to the next. Given this, one could not expect anything to follow 
about a further phenomenal perspective over and above them given an arrangement of 
subjects.  
All of this is true. But it is not to the point when it comes to the model of phenomenal 
combination offered here. On the present model, phenomenally-qualitied ultimates are not 
subjects. But this changes the face of the argument entirely. Because the phenomenally-
qualitied ultimates Goff considers are subjects they cannot unite, pool together. So if Goff is 
to envisage any relationship between the many subjects being taken to compose the relevant 
part of his brain and his, Goff’s, o-conscious phenomenal perspective, it will have to be that 
this body of subjects somehow spawns a further, distinct subject. But there is just no reason, 
as NSS rightly has it, to think that this will happen. This explains Goff’s reasoning when he 
says that his phenomenal perspective is ‘a different conscious experience with a different 
phenomenal character to each of the conscious experiences I am supposing to be had by each 
of my ultimates’ (op. cit.). Crucially, the relationship presently envisaged between the 
phenomenal character of the phenomenally-qualitied ultimates composing him and that of 
Goff’s o-consciousness is quite different. On the present view, the phenomenal characters of 
the ultimates composing Goff’s brain jointly constitute the phenomenal character of his o-
conscious phenomenal field, they do not spawn it as a separate entity. This feature enables us 
to overcome an objection lurking in Goff’s account concerning the unity of o-experience: 
‘The existence of a subject having a unified experience of feeling cold and tired and smelling 
roast beef does not seem to be a priori entailed by the existence of a subject that feels cold, a 
subject that feels tired, and a subject that smells roast beef’ (Ibid.) In our model the 
phenomenal elements of cold, tiredness and the smell of roast beef come together closely 
enough to form a phenomenal unity: they are experienced together as overlapping features of 
the same phenomenal field. This is thanks to the pooling of the intrinsic natures of the 
phenomenally-qualitied ultimates, possible due to their subjectless nature. 
The question we must now ask, in order to properly evaluate the panpsychic zombie 
argument, is the following. If the ultimates composing the relevant portion of Goff’s brain 
instantiated the relevant phenomenal qualities (coldness, tiredness and roast beef smell, etc.), 
and were pooled to form a unified phenomenal field comprising these elements (and many 
more), would it then be conceivable that there was no o-conscious phenomenal perspective 
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present? It seems much less clear that the answer to this question will come out in favour of 
the proponent of the panpsychic zombie argument. For when we outline the nature of a 
unified phenomenal field composed of pooled ultimates instantiating phenomenal coldness, 
tiredness and the smell of roast beef, what we seem to be doing is precisely describing an o-
conscious phenomenal perspective of the sort that Goff enjoys. It seems that if the 
phenomenal ultimates can pool in the way we envisage, then their suitable arrangement 
cannot occur without an o-conscious phenomenal perspective forming. We have thus shown 
how panpsychism can provide for the overall state of consciousness of a subject such as one 
of us, and Goff’s panpsychic zombie argument fails. 
Interestingly, Goff seems open to the central idea of our account. Late in his paper he 
imagines the possibility that  
 
the parts of my brain, before they came together to form my brain, had their own 
individual phenomenal lives. But when they come together to form my brain they lose 
their individual conscious identities, and somehow morph into o-experience had by the 
whole brain. I think we can some imaginative grip on this picture. (Goff 2009b, 25) 
 
Having uncovered this tantalising possibility, apparently so close to the present proposal, 
Goff’s rejection of it is puzzling. He says we may as well imagine that ‘bog standard 
physical properties’ (Ibid.) when they come together ‘somehow’ develop o-experience. He 
likens the panpsychist proposal to a straightforward version of emergentism, and takes the 
view that between panpsychist emergentism and physicalist emergentism the physicalist 
version is preferable for reasons of ontological economy. Goff may well be right about the 
balance of theory-choice in this case. But he is wrong to assimilate the panpsychist proposal 
to emergentism. On our picture the o-conscious phenomenal perspective Goff enjoys is (the 
‘is’ of constitution) the fused unity of a multitude of phenomenally-qualitied ultimates 
instantiating the relevant phenomenal qualities. The resultant whole is no more a case of 
ontological emergence than is the existence of the Maja Desnuda once Goya has laid down 
and suitably combined all the relevant paint patches. In contrast, the physical composition of 
Goff’s o-consciousness would be more like imagining—to pursue the analogy—that Goya’s 
pencil sketch of the Maja sprang to colourful, painterly life of its own accord, as soon as all 
(and only) the pencil marks were set down. That certainly would be emergence worthy of the 
name. On one side we have the notion of the assembly into a whole of instances of existing 
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qualitative nature. On the other side we have the idea of the spontaneous generation of 
qualitative nature from components entirely lacking in it. It is the considerable sense-making 
capacity of the former picture in which the appeal of panpsychism still consists, despite the 
efforts of its critics.∗ 
 
Sam COLEMAN 
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